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ABSTRACT
Objectives To explore the success of the introduction of 
the National Health Service (NHS) 111 urgent care service 
and describe service activity in the period 2014–2016.
Design Comparative mixed method case study of five 
NHS 111 service providers and analysis of national level 
routine data on activity and service use.
Settings and data Our primary research involved five 
NHS 111 sites in England. We conducted 356 hours of non-
participant observation in NHS 111 call centres and the 
urgent care centres and, linked to these observations, held 
6 focus group interviews with 47 call advisors, clinical and 
managerial staff. This primary research is augmented by a 
secondary analysis of routine data about the 44 NHS 111 
sites in England contained in the NHS 111 Minimum Data 
Set made available by NHS England.
Results Opinions vary depending on the criteria used to 
judge the success of NHS 111. The service has been rolled 
out across 44 sites. The 111 phone number is operational 
and the service has replaced its predecessor NHS Direct. 
This new service has led to changes in who does the work 
of managing urgent care demand, achieving significant 
labour substitution. Judged against internal performance 
criteria, the service appears not to meet some targets such 
as call answering times, but it has seen a steady increase 
in use over time. Patients appear largely satisfied with NHS 
111, but the view from some stakeholders is more mixed. 
The impact of NHS 111 on other health services is difficult 
to assess and cost-effectiveness has not been established.
Conclusion The new urgent care service NHS 111 has 
been brought into use but its success against some key 
criteria has not been comprehensively proven.
IntroductIon
National Health Service (NHS) 111 provides 
telephone triage for urgent care in England. 
The service is free to use and is available 
24 hours a day, 365 days a year across England. 
It is positioned at the heart of the policy vision 
for integrated care set out in the Five-Year 
Forward View (2014) and the more recent 
General Practice Forward View (2016).1 2
Depending on who you ask, NHS 111 is 
‘a high-quality service in the face of high 
demand’,3 a serial killer of babies4 5 or the 
source of an increasing and inappropriate 
burden on over stretched NHS ambulance 
and emergency care services.6 7 These wildly 
contrasting views suggest that evaluating the 
success or otherwise of this service depends 
on the criteria used. Nonetheless, given the 
centrality of NHS 111 as the ‘front door’ for 
the newly proposed Clinical Hubs (which will 
provide clinical advice and support to patients 
and professionals outside hospital settings), it 
seems timely to consider what we have learnt 
about NHS 111.
NHS 111 was officially launched in 
February 2014 following piloting in four 
sites in England in 2010 (evaluated by 
researchers at the University of Sheffield.8 9) 
and the establishment of further ‘first wave’ 
services in the intervening years. Its prede-
cessor, NHS Direct, previously available on 
a 0845 telephone number, was discontinued 
in March 2014, and there are extant plans 
to extend NHS 111 to Wales. Badged as 
the service ‘for when it is less urgent than 
999’, NHS 111 is incorporated in a policy 
vision for ‘a functionally integrated 24/7 
urgent care service that is the ‘front door’ 
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Strengths and limitations of this study
 ► Unique primary study of five NHS 111 provides rich 
detail about service provision and wider impact, 
notably on Urgent Care Centres.
 ► Complementary analysis of routine data on activity 
provides a higher level, national view of the service.
 ► Together these analyses can be used to assess the 
success of this new model of urgent care provision.
 ► The case study data are qualitative and not 
statistically generalisable, but they provide useful 
insights about the service.
 ► The quantitative analysis was reliant on publicly 
available data and is thus limited in terms of what 
is collected/reported, and there are substantial 
missing data notably on resource use and costs. 
However, these data provide a consistent time series 
and it is unlikely that the trends we have observed 
are data collection or classification artefact.
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Table 2 Caller experience
Caller experience
April–
September 2014
(n=11 572)
October 2014–
March 2015
(n=13 138)
April–
September 2015
(n=12 185)
October 2015–
March 2016
(n=10 950)
All surveys
(n=47 845)
Very satisfied with 
111 experience 68.8% 68.0% 70.3% 64.6% 68.0%
Fairly satisfied with 
111 experience 18.1% 19.7% 19.1% 19.7% 19.2%
Neither satisfied 
nor dissatisfied with 
111 experience 3.8% 4.3% 4.1% 4.8% 4.3%
Dissatisfied with 
111 experience* 6.1% 6.1% 5.3% 6.9% 6.1%
No view on 
satisfaction with 
111 experience 3.2% 1.9% 1.2% 4.0% 2.5%
No response 1.4% 0.1% 1.2% 6.2% 2.1%
Percentages for responses to satisfaction questions were calculated by the authors using the sum of valid responses as denominator (rows 1 
to 5 sum to 100%).
No response was calculated by the authors, subtracting the sum of recorded responses' satisfaction questions from number responding to 
the survey (as reported in the MDS).
*The MDS collapses the ‘fairly dissatisfied’ and ‘very dissatisfied’ categories into one.
MDS, minimum data set; n, number of people responding to the survey as reported in the MDS.
of the NHS and which provides the public with access 
to both treatment and clinical advice’ (page 4,10) that 
has emerged following the Urgent and Emergency Care 
Review led by Sir Bruce Keogh.11
NHS 111 uses a computer decision support system 
(CDSS) called NHS Pathways to manage calls. Pathways 
is an algorithm built on an extensive library of current, 
regularly updated, clinical expertise combined with 
a real-time directory of services (DoS) available for 
patients who need to be seen. This software is unusual 
in the UK health system in that it was designed and 
developed by and continues to be owned and licensed 
by the NHS. Most other CDSS are developed and owned 
by private corporations. The Pathways CDSS is also 
licensed for, and used in UK NHS ambulance services, 
several of whom provide NHS 111 alongside their 999 
emergency services. NHS 111 calls are answered by 
non-clinical staff who are supported by nurses, para-
medics and general practitioners (GPs) (often one 
or two clinicians are available on each shift). The call 
handlers use the Pathways CDSS to assess accounts of 
symptoms, prioritise care needs and direct callers to 
services or self-care. Calls conclude with a ‘disposition’ 
which can range from sending an ambulance, arranging 
a home visit, booking an urgent primary care consulta-
tion or advising actions the caller can take to address 
their health problem.
In this paper we draw on our detailed case study of 
five NHS 111 sites and subsequent secondary analysis of 
routine data made available by NHS England to explore 
the success or otherwise of this service against key criteria 
of deployment (spread), meeting performance targets, 
satisfaction, impact on other services and cost-effective-
ness.
Methods
We conducted a comparative case study of five English 
NHS 111 call centres between 2011 and 2013.12 This 
comprised 356 hours of non-participant observation of 
NHS 111 call centres and linked out-of-hours services, 6 
focus groups with a total of 47 staff and key stakeholders 
and a staff survey (the latter is not reported here). This 
study followed on from an earlier study investigating the 
deployment of NHS Pathways software in 999 and out-of-
hours call handling sites.13 Our continued interest in 
seeing how this service fared after our study completed 
led us to undertake a quantitative secondary analysis. 
To do this we obtained the NHS 111 Minimum Data Set 
(MDS) made publicly available by NHS England14 which 
comprises call data from the 44 NHS 111 sites in England 
for the period 2010–2016. We provide a descriptive anal-
ysis focused on the period February 2014–July 2016 (the 
latest date for which data were available) in order to 
examine the period beyond our case study work.
Qualitative data were analysed together using a 
broadly inductive method, moving from familiarisa-
tion and independent coding to team discussion and 
recoding and the development of emerging themes. 
Charting techniques were used to facilitate cross-case 
comparisons and to enable further discussion in the 
team about interpretations. Secondary analysis of the 
NHS MDS was conducted using descriptive and time-se-
ries functions in R.15
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results
successful deployment?
In England, NHS 111 has expanded from the orig-
inal pilots in 2010 in County Durham and Darlington, 
Nottingham, Lincolnshire and Luton and now operates 
in 44 sites across the country. So the overall picture is one 
of a successful roll-out of this service.
NHS 111 initially received backing from a number of 
key stakeholders including the British Medical Associa-
tion and the Royal Colleges of Medicine (although these 
organisations have also periodically voiced concerns), 
and successfully navigated initial turbulence and tech-
nical difficulties associated with the pilot phase.16 Our 
research indicated that considerable effort was expended 
by central government policy-makers and key local stake-
holders locally and nationally to smooth the deployment 
of the software and launch the new service, but it is now 
an established part of the urgent care service landscape. 
The local effort in terms of additional staff and additional 
work is captured in the focus group exchange below:
111 Manager 1: It was…it very quickly leapt from 
being, you know, a very short-term thing to a very 
long-term thing. I have a deputy that works with me, 
to help run the team, and I was told she was going 
to be seconded for  months. And 18 months later, 
she’s still here (laughter). So it sort of started off as 
this small thing, then all of a sudden, whoa, it was 
something much, much bigger 
Interviewer: And what have been the effects of that, 
do you think?
UCC Nurse 1: Stress. At all levels, I think. From, you 
know…
111 Nurse 2: Fear… […]
111 Nurse 1: Everybody’s wearing three or four 
different hats and doing extra work over and above 
what they used to do.
111 Site 4, focus group 2
Analysis of the MDS shows that the service currently takes 
over 1 million calls per month (see table 1). Time-series 
decomposition (using the R stl() function) indicates an 
increasing trend in the number of calls initiated, from 
just over 1 million per month at launch to approximately 
1¼ million by the middle of 2016 (see online supplemen-
tary figure 1).
does the service meet its own performance targets?
Service standard 3.22 in the NHS 111 Commissioning 
Standards,17 states that ‘[p]atient calls … should be 
resolved in a single contact’. Two items reported in the 
MDS indicate that this is not always achieved and that 
performance against this criterion may be declining over 
time. Table 1 shows that, while the proportion of calls 
transferred to a clinical advisor have remained relatively 
constant at around 20% of all calls answered, the propor-
tion of these calls that are transferred directly to a clinical 
advisor (referred to as warm transfers) has declined over 
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time (from 58% to 36%). At the same time, the overall 
proportion of calls resulting in a separate call back phone 
call has increased from 8.4% to 12.6%. Care should be 
exercised in interpreting these measures, as the propor-
tion of call backs is calculated on the total number of calls 
answered, not on the smaller number of calls designated 
as ‘transferred to a clinical advisor’.
The MDS Providers Version specification18 lists two 
items indicating conformance with National Quality 
Standard 8 for Delivery of Out-Of-Hours Services (to 
minimise the number of abandoned calls and to ensure 
calls are answered within 60 s). Table 1 indicates that 
both these standards have been missed in at least one 
period since the official launch. The benchmark that 
95% of calls should be answered within 60 s (adopted in 
MDS statistical reports) has rarely been met, while the 
maximum of 5% of calls being abandoned by the caller 
was breached during Quarter 4 of 2015/16. The service 
appears to be operating under particular pressure from 
Quarter 3 2015/16 forward—in terms of all unanswered 
calls, answering calls within 60 s and abandoned calls 
(see online supplementary figure 2 for full details).
Our observational work suggested that staff worked 
hard to try to meet performance targets but that this was 
not always possible:
The dispatcher is controlling the cars for home visits. 
She has to decide how urgent the call is to decide who 
to send where, also keeping an eye on target times 
according to category. If it gets close to the target and 
the patient hasn’t been seen she gets the clinical lead 
to give them a ‘comfort call’. If it becomes clear that 
they can’t hit targets she will look again at the urgent 
calls to see if it looks like any can be regraded. In fact, 
she says, she reviews all ‘urgents’ that come direct 
from call handlers and asks the clinician to take 
another look. I ask ‘Do they ever run out of cars?’ 
‘Yes, all the time. We have to renegotiate. We use the 
clinical lead a lot’.
111 Site 4, Observation
satisfaction
Patients and callers seem largely satisfied with the service. 
The evaluation of the pilot sites8 reported that overall 
satisfaction was very good, with 73% (1255/1726) of 
survey respondents reporting that they were very satis-
fied with the new service. A more recent review led by 
the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health which 
looked at 111 services in North West London found that 
84% of people calling the helpline ‘got what they needed’, 
whereas 80% said they would call NHS 111 again if they 
had the same problem.19 Analysis of the MDS indicates 
that 87% of patients are very or fairly satisfied with the 
service (see table 2).
Healthcare professionals appear to have a more mixed 
response to questions about satisfaction with NHS 111. 
Early on the service was called ‘dreadful’ by GP leaders 
calling for a review of the structure of the service6 but 
recently a more optimistic view has emerged in some 
quarters.20 Anderson and Roland’s observational anal-
ysis7 suggested that the service would benefit from having 
more experienced GPs involved in triage decisions, 
and elsewhere it has been suggested that only one in 
four NHS 111 referrals to general practice are clinically 
appropriate,21 and this may be the cause of some dissat-
isfaction among primary care professionals. In 2014, an 
NHS England Quality and Safety Report22 concluded 
that there were high levels of variation in clinical gover-
nance arrangements around the quality of the DoS and 
the quality of communication between out-of-hours 
services and NHS 111, all of which might contribute to 
dissatisfaction among service providers. Online and print 
media coverage, perhaps not unsurprisingly focuses on 
‘bad news’ and patient and public dissatisfaction (see, 
eg, refs 23–26) but our focus groups suggested that service 
providers felt that callers were satisfied with the new 
service:
Manager: the older generation … they wouldn't 
phone 999 because, ‘oh well, you're very busy, and 
I don't think I need an ambulance’, whereas the 
111 has now given them that option that actually, ‘I 
can ring that number, because it's there to help me, 
because it's not going to tie up an ambulance’ [Group 
nodding and sounds of agreement] So, you know, it's 
opened that door, so, and we are seeing that.
Site 3, focus group.
Call handler 1: People know that they can go to work 
and then just ring 111 when they come in on a night-
time, and they know they’re going to be seen… or at 
least have their symptoms triaged …. So I think it’s 
successful in that extent,
Site 1, focus group.
Impact on other services?
One criteria of the success of NHS 111 might be whether 
it reduced the demand for other services. However, the 
impact on other health services is notoriously difficult to 
assess. Clearly NHS 111 has replaced NHS Direct, which 
was officially discontinued in March 2014. The pilot eval-
uation showed that NHS 111 did not have a statistically 
significant impact on emergency ambulance calls, but 
there was a statistically significant increase in emergency 
ambulance incidentattendances.9 Analysis of the MDS 
shows that, to date, an average of 11.3% of eligible calls 
resulted in an emergency ambulance dispatch and that 
8.1% of callers were recommended to attend accident 
and emergency (see table 3 for quarterly data).
Our case study data suggested that staff believe that 
the NHS 111 service may have increased the number of 
‘non-urgent calls’ (compared with previous out-of-hours 
primary care services), including those from people 
seeking medical advice and reassurance:
Interviewer: In terms of daytime demand for 111, 
have you seen changes since it started?
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111 Call handler 1: It’s doubled.
111 Clinician: we have certainly had a huge increase 
in demand …A lot more requests now for health 
information are coming through, and general advice.
Interviewer: where do those health information calls 
go? Who answers them?
111 Clinician: The majority we sort ourselves, within 
[111]. Some are referred to other areas, more 
expertise, some back to their own GPs… In the out of 
hours period [the UCC] assists us… but the majority 
are sourced in-house.
111 Call handler 2: Sometimes it’s just a telephone 
number … very simple…
111 Call handler 3: Quite often… it's a dental help 
line number, … my son's got chicken pox, can he go 
to school, … through to some really quite complex 
stuff that we've been getting.
Site 3, Focus group.
In addition, the referral of patients from NHS 111 to 
other services sometimes put pressure on working rela-
tionships between services:
Clinician 2 says that one of the big problems is 
‘sending all the home visits through as a 2 hour 
priority’. …He says that many of these calls do 
not need visiting within 2 hours. Other problems 
include sending cases to the UCC that really require 
Emergency Department visit. …He says that there is 
some tension with [111] about triaging and what the 
UCC perceive as incorrect dispositions. He says that 
[111] will ‘never admit they are wrong’.
UCC site 1, Observation.
Is nhs 111 cost-effective?
There is a significant lack of robust data about resource 
use and costing of this service, both in terms of initia-
tion and ongoing running costs. The development costs 
for the CDSS software are not publicly available and it 
has been outside the scope of our studies to obtain cost 
data for individual NHS 111 services which are sepa-
rately commissioned by Clinical Commissioning Groups. 
The use of some existing infrastructure and estate (call 
centre accommodation, telephony, computing and 
training facilities and human resource management 
capability) from NHS Direct and or Ambulance Service 
sites compounds the difficulties in calculating initiation 
costs. The Sheffield evaluation team was able to estimate 
costs for the four pilot sites as £201 000 per month, with 
a total impact for the NHS of £307 000 per month.8 This 
averaged as £12.26 per call, however the report authors 
urged caution around these estimates due to variability 
in services across the four sites. A significant barrier to 
assessing cost-effectiveness is the lack of data on measur-
able health outcomes and the difficulties in capturing and 
disaggregating activity data (eg, walk-in centre, urgent 
care centre and emergency department use) and lack 
of data on other key costs (eg, in-hours general practice 
dedicated to urgent care). The increasing involvement 
of private sector providers and competitive contracting 
processes has introduced commercial sensitivities that are 
likely to prevent full economic costing of these services in 
the future.
dIscussIon
summary of our findings
The UK NHS 111 service has fundamentally changed the 
way in which urgent care is organised and delivered. This 
service is now predominantly provided by non-clinical call 
handling staff using a specially designed decision-support 
software, supported by clinical advisors. The provision 
of this service has thus moved into the domain formerly 
occupied by nurses in NHS Direct, and before that by 
medical doctors who traditionally triaged and managed 
out-of-hours urgent care services. This represents a 
significant labour substitution and deployment of digital 
technology in the NHS. The service has been successfully 
rolled out across 44 sites. It has seen a steady increase in 
demand over time with significant peaks in winter months. 
Although the service aspires to ensure that patients 
receive the ‘right advice in the right place, first time’ it 
seems that an increasing percentage of calls require a call 
back suggesting that callers are not getting a one-stop 
service. The service appears not to meet some targets such 
as call answering times, but patients appear largely satis-
fied. This satisfaction is not consistently evident among 
other stakeholders, notably general practice and news 
media which offer more negative accounts. The impact 
of NHS 111 on other health services is difficult to assess 
and cost-effectiveness has not been established. While 
labour substitution is often driven by a desire to reduce 
costs, it should not be assumed that employing ‘cheaper’ 
non-clinical staff to assess calls has reduced overall costs 
to the NHS, if for example, considerably more of them 
are needed to deliver the same service as the clinical staff 
they replace.
strengths and limitations
The primary study reported here was built on a previous 
project which examined the CDSS used by NHS 111 
in different emergency and urgent healthcare service 
settings. It provided rich detail about the five case studies 
and captured the diversity of organisational models 
in different NHS 111 services at different points in the 
deployment cycle (some were early adopters/pilots). 
We were only able to explore the impact of NHS 111 on 
Urgent Care Centres and recognise that a wider network 
of health services are involved in the provision of urgent 
care, which we were not able to explore. It was beyond the 
scope of our primary case study work to directly explore 
patient experiences, so we are only able to report staff 
perceptions of satisfaction and service use. The analysis of 
the MDS is limited to the published, aggregate, data and 
is subject to decisions made by the NHS 111 Programme 
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Team on reporting categories. The analysis is further 
limited by substantial missing data under some head-
ings—for example, the resource use and cost (contract 
value) items typically have >50% observations missing. 
However, the MDS represents a consistent time series 
over the period and it is unlikely that the trends we have 
observed are data collection or classification artefact.
Implications
A core theme of the Hollywood movie ‘Field of Dreams’ 
is ‘build it and people will come’. (In the film this refers 
to a baseball pitch constructed in the Iowan cornfields.) 
NHS 111 appears to have pulled off a similar feat. It had 
over 15 million users in 2016 and an apparently upward 
trend in demand. For the most part, the patients who use 
the service appear satisfied. If roll out, use and patient 
satisfaction are markers of success, then NHS 111 can 
be deemed highly successful. However, our analysis of 
five case studies and routine activity data from 44 sites 
suggest that a more nuanced assessment can be made. 
We lack strong evidence of the impact of NHS 111 on 
health outcomes or on the wider network of services such 
as emergency care—although our research has provided 
some evidence about negative views expressed by some 
staff in Urgent Care Centres. The lack of cost-effective-
ness analyses is more significant. Although it is often 
assumed that labour substitution saves money, this is not 
always the case.27
NHS 111 is currently being championed as the single 
point of access to urgent care, alongside the new policy 
vision for clinical hubs which will expand the clinical 
input to urgent care (the model is that NHS 111 will 
transfer more callers to nurse practitioners and GPs).28 
This appears very similar to the operating model of NHS 
Direct, the service NHS 111 replaced. Moreover, approxi-
mately 50% of the current callers to NHS 111 are directed 
to primary care where they consult a doctor or nurse. A 
cynic might ask if this is success or merely the reinvention 
of an old wheel?
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